

WHAT IF:

pl. U-2 overflight of Sakhalin of Aug 30 and Chinat loss of 8 Sept (relative importance of these?) had occurred prior to Aug 29?

- a) flight schedule
- b) conclusions/expectations on SAMs
- c) conclusions on missiles
- d) relative weight to collateral sources
- e) sense of urgency; fever chart of crisis
- f) public assertions, commitments; subsequent response.

2. ~~Mr~~ SAMs had not been discovered Aug 29 (because of weather, coverage, etc.):

- Impact on:
- a) disbelief in collateral sources;
 - b) expectation of missiles
 - c) willingness to check out later reports of missiles.

3. MRBMs had been discovered sooner, around mid-Sept? (clearly non-operational)
Impact on: (fewer)

- a) Shock, surprise;
- b) Willingness to attack immediately (higher, because safer, smaller; or less, because less shocking, less threatening?)
- c) Ability to persuade public and Allies of need for 1) independent action; 2) fast action; 3) violent action.
- d) Convergence within ExComm.
- e) Imminence of deadline; effects of longer deadline.

4. MRBMs had been discovered later, or had been installed faster and more completely: warheads, more missiles, complete sites, ~~exploded~~ : a) alert; (b) non-alert.

Impact on:

- a) Relevance of blockade.
- b) Willingness to attack: increased threat vs. increased risk, difficulty, damage.
- c) Increased shock, and effects of this.
- d) Likelihood of fast, early response; and effects of this.

5. JFK had not made public distinction between offensive/defensive? Had not implied commitment to resist offensive?

WHAT IF:

6. If K had made deployment public, and preceded it with reassuring and justifying moves and statements? (including Cuban request, allegations of US aggressive plans, assurance of Sov control, reference to Turkey, freedom of seas...)

a) Reaction of Allies, public; OAS.

b) Effect of move, if successful, on SU bargaining improvement over Berlin.

(If US had acquiesced, it would be under Allied pressure, lack of Sov deception or immediate threat, no explicit JFK commitment; no shock or panic reaction in fall '62;

c) Effect on domestic politics (lacking period of allegation and denial, JFK commitments).

7. K had, prior to Oct 22, leaked facts and reassurances to US Allies, e.g., Britain?

8. K had given no grounds for charging deception? K had actually informed JFK privately?

9. Keating and others had not charged presence of missiles? Presence of buildup?

10. Deployment had taken place in 1961, prior to exposure of Missile Gap? After exposure of Missile Gap?

11. After Castro had exposed, denounced U-2 flights prior to Aug 29? After Aug 29? Activated SAMs? Fired SAM? Shot down U-2?

WHAT DIFFERENCES COULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE TO:

1. / 1. K's expectations of US response: a) prior to decision; b) prior to July 62; c) prior to mid-Sept 62; d) prior to Oct 22?
2. US interpretation of SU motives.
3. US expectation of SU response to various US counteractions.
4. US willingness to blockade; b) to follow blockade with attack; c) to precede blockade by attack.
- 2 5. Chance that Sov move would trigger an~~t~~ unwarned US strike.
- 7 6. JFK willingness to commit himself to resist offensive deployment.
7. Allied acceptance of US: a) failure to consult
b) failure to inform earlier
c) proposed course of action
d) more violent action
e) trades, if proposed
- 4 8. K's degree of belief in JFK's public commitments: in general; regarding Cuba.
- 3 9. US willingness to blockade (e.g., belief that deployment was ~~incomplete~~ complete? Prior Allied knowledge? Sov threats--to US, public, Allies? UN attitude? OAS acceptance?)
- 6 10. JFK's feeling of having been deceived by K.
- 3 11. US willingness to overfly at all, Sept-Oct 62?
- 2 12. US disbelief that Sovs would move in MRBMs.

How could K have gotten away with it?

WHAT COULD KHRUSHCHEV HAVE DONE TO:

- 3 1. Deter overflights between July--Oct 62? Aug-Sept 62?
- 1 2. Prevent JFK from committing US to respond?
- 4 3. Defuse US response between 14--22 Oct.
- 2 4. Delay recognition of missiles and sites by U-2?

what was the result?

*into military control of the situation
"Independent political, financial, and administrative"*

some results of the Cuban Missile Crisis?

Independent political, financial, and administrative

John Hyland: in EE/ONE (Eastern Europe; SU) 5 June

xm

1. Initial attitudes in CIA estimate, 16-17 Oct.
2. Reaction when told.
3. Interplay with McC (McC certainty; theory; a nut; Russk reaction)
4. memo over weekend; Kent attitude.
5. Konler interview: acted as if didn't know.
6. Turkey: our ~~base~~ strategic territory, long before missiles put there; in Cuba, SU making free of "our" territory (what if they had created base, waited couple of years; eased in with subs, etc.)
7. Attitude to news of Il-28's; feeling that SU was "testing," faster than expected.
8. SNIE actually drafted last week in Aug (sure SAMS there).
~~xx~~ McC rejected Cuban group SNIE, brought in EE to consider military buildup, possibility of missiles.
9. McC attitude; wrong guesses.
10. Theories of Sov calculation: 1) now accepting big risk;~~xxxxxx~~
2) Underestimating risk; 3) Hyland: desperation, severely pressed by need for improvement (last chance), led to wishful underestimation of risk; 4) (my?) risk not underestimated; but badly played by K, good circumstances for US, good playing by US;
11. Estimates played small role; discredited; worked mainly for McC, didn't influence him much; Pres relied on non-intell advisors and McC for predictions, didn't look to Estimates for predictions, analysis.
12. McC desire to bomb, hawk (eagle); but, prediction (early) of strong SU reaction (bomb Thule/ Berlin, SEAsia, Turkey, Iran) to attack, especially if any Russian soldiers killed; thought gov should prepare.
13. K interview with Gandni; fake mobilization, deployment, alert. question whether war would have followed.
14. No question put to ONE on effect of action/preparation/ultimatum (though memoto MCC, early, on ultimatum--instead of blockade; thought this would only lead to counterpressure by SU). No tendency to initiate such an estimate. If asked, would probably not have believed in brilliantly effective style of handling.
15. Sovs surprised (Zorin reaction; failure to hedge at all, e.g., to install SAMS before letting us see missiles). Effectiveness of our secrecy; due to what? Very bad "crisis management" by Sovs.
16. Process; special group in ONE; work on estimates; work for McC;
17. Process of producing SNIE, NIE (proposal accepted by Kent; draft; considered by Board; Board member chairman of est, intell comm representatives (e.g., Sohn) aid solicited, conference; USIB
18. Question of asking, in SNIE: 1) But suppose he got away with it, what would it be worth? 2) What would it take for him to get away with it; What might keep us from attacking? (He should have anticipated threats, deployment, etc; should have hedged more against possibility)

John Whitman:

1. Process: ONE, BNE, USIB ; amount of coordination; role of DCI.
2. Unprecedented: Rostow panel, assignment of Whitman, sharp split between DCI and ONE (roles of Harris, Hitchcock; Tidwell?)
3. Issues on SNIE: likelihood of Sov military response; relative likelihood of strong response to invasion, limited military attack.
4. Feeling by 22 Oct on likely Sov response to limited, controlled US response. reaction to blockade proposal.
5. W. reaction to news (told, "MCC was right") ; prior commitment to position because of McC producing of Kent.
6. Fear of effect on McC/ONE.
7. ~~Do~~ Do analysts get timely, comprehensive info on private, verbal messages to SU? (didn't know about F-S). Do they ask, what tacit info is our whole posture and pattern of behavior and statements affecting opponent's expectations?

8.

The U-2 and the Crisis

1. What was the relative importance of the roles of the photos in:
 - a) Convincing intelligence analysts?
 - b) Convincing top Presidential advisors?
 - c) Convincing the President?
 - d) Catching the attention of advisors, President?
 - e) Earlier, supporting negative beliefs as to missiles?
 - f) Establishing the relative credibility of various informants?
 - g) Establishing the need for further information?
 - h) Convincing Congress; the press; the public; allies; Soviets; UN.

(Note problem: earlier unsuitability of photographic evidence to convince these critics that missiles were not there; as in Missile Gap crisis.)

(Note McInamara's attempt to use photos in this role, after all, to show that missiles had left; but note the costs of such comprehensive revelations, and limited positive effects).

2. Photos, as information available to a limited group and not outside, create a "data differential" between that group and others including not only the public but the staff of the "elite." This may be reflected in a systematic difference of opinion (e.g., if "outside" group has access to, or is leaked, a part of the information available to elite, e.g., collateral reports or corresponding journalistic sources: Keating), where "elite" is unable to reveal that it has additional information, or what it is. Thus, the difference appears to the critic and to observers as revealing simply a difference in interpretation of the same data, revealing in turn a difference in preconceptions or goals. The photos (or other elite sources) may either negate the other evidence--as prior to Aug. 29, 62 (or ~~tx~~ during 1958-60)--or suggest a different interpretation--as between Aug 29 and Oct 14 (SAs)--or reinforce the other evidence--as after Oct 14. In the first case, the Administration will seem lethargic, inattentive, wishfully negligent, or bound by the inertia of preconceptions, etc--particularly to those who do have access to ~~px~~ opposing data and thus have a claim to be recognized by public as "informed experts" (note legacy of Gaither Committee, particularly ~~xx~~ during 1958-60; general position of Congressional critics and non-profit "experts"). There is, in fact, often enough a basis for this charge, and it is difficult for the public to distinguish those cases in which this is not so (especially because security relating to the special information is often kept unusually well).

In latter two cases, Gov may be tempted to release photostats to support its case; but if it does not, it can now appear reckless, wishful, too ready to jump to conclusions on insubstantial evidence; fears as ~~xxx~~ to its probable future "false alarm rate" may arise, and precautionary measures taken by Allies and opponents.

To guard the source of its special information, elite may even be forced to take actions counter-indicating their possession of it. (This may arise when the data-differential refers to the existence of detailed plans or covert objectives. Note Nixon dilemma when JFK proposed aiding invasion of Cuba; the dilemma when Stevenson proposed stopping tests?

Atkins and David H. ...

3. Different impact of negative and positive results from photos. Distinguish between photos that negate other evidence--as when photos show definitely that there are no missiles on a particular site, contrary to specific reports--and photos that fail to confirm ~~x~~ other evidence or to point in the same direction--as when photos failed to show that missiles were being dismantled, or showed conflicting indications.

Is it generally true that negative evidence from photos, or even failure to confirm other evidence, is given more weight at high levels than at lower levels of analysis, or more weight than it should get? Or, are there circumstances in which this occurs?

Even where the photos strongly negate some specific hypothesis of interest, there may be other specific hypotheses, or broader hypotheses, almost as plausible a priori, which these photos simply fail to confirm (or even support). Proponents of the earlier, discredited hypotheses will be motivated to generate such alternatives: less hurt by this specific evidence, and perhaps less vulnerable to this form of test. This motivation may discredit the search operation; yet the hypotheses it turns up may be worthy of consideration.

E.g.; a) Should the Administration have been as confident as it was (?) in the adequacy of U-2 coverage prior to May, 1960? What does Cuba affair tell us about this? How about MRBM/IRBMs?

b) How much confidence can be placed in photo evidence that all missiles were removed from Cuba?

c

Can there be "hard" evidence of a negative nature, except as relating to a highly specific hypothesis? Are photos that fail to show certain phenomena treated as being as "hard" as if they distinctly showed other phenomena?

(How does the "hard" evidence relate to the above?)

1. How explain that missiles were transported clandestinely, but not constructed covertly?

2. How does installation and operation of SAMs in Cuba compare with practice elsewhere when SAMs have been deployed? With Soviet practice?
Have they ever activated SAMs piecemeal?

3. What Was Sept. 10 flight cancelled because of Chinat shootdown?

4. What if Aug. 30 and Sept 8 U-2 incidents had occurred prior to Aug. 29;
a) Would SAMs have been discovered so early?
b) In absence of flights, might collateral reports have caused more concern?
e.g., in absence of evidence on SAMs, suggesting alternative explanation?

5. Is absence of recon, because of incidents or weather, reflected in planning or declaratory activity? (Or are planning activities geared to the expectation that recon will continue or proceed soon, with no adjustment for unexpected delays?)

6. Is there a tendency to react to information-flow as if it closely corresponded to flow of events being observed? E.g., to react to sudden exposure to data as if external events had moved rapidly (e.g., increase of info on missiles between 16 and 18 Oct ~~xxxx~~ because of increase in coverage; tendency to treat as if revealing crash activity? Sudden increases in identification of activities not previously covered or recognized; does this create crisis atmosphere? e.g., SA-2s after 29 Aug.; SA-2s in East Germany and SU)

Or does lack of newly confirming evidence create atmosphere that "nothing new is happening," even though lack may reflect absence of recon for weather or other reasons. Or, "something may be happening but there is no 'hard' evidence of it." E.g., Admin statements about missiles in period 5 Sept--14 Oct; or intell. statements about dismantling, 30 Oct--2 Nov.

7x

7. Why knew of emergence of SAM system on 26-27 Oct in US? How was it interpreted, at the time? Who analysed it for ExComm?

8. How might this have been related to shootdown of U-2 on 27 Oct? When, in what sequence, did news of this come in? How was it interpreted, in various stages, by various people?

9. What evidence is there that SU considered concealment from high-alt photography possible?

10. Is there reason to believe that missiles did not come on ship prior to mid-Sept?

11. With what other Sov operations can this deployment be compared? What are differences, similarities: e.g., in secrecy, concurrency, site preparation, C&C, security, timing, manning? How much intelligence did we get out of it? Was this foreseeable by Sovs? (Was this reason for predicting Sovs wouldn't put base here?)

Southard: 21 April 1964

Fomin told Scali, Sat morning (27 Oct) that K had not received reply from State before sending Sat. morning letter on Turkey-Cuba. This was blatantly untrue; Fomin got reply about 7:30-8 Friday night, must have sent it immediately, K would have had it about 12 hours before broadcast of Turkey letter.

((But: might Fomin know of a foulup in comm, or or delay in transmitting to K at other end? Consider delays in Moscow--Washington. Might K have been unavailable? What was means of transmission from Russian Embassy in Washington? How does Hot Line change this?))

((Who knew of Scali deal Friday night: before ExComm meeting? Was ExComm told? Who knew by Saturday-Sunday? Did some see the Friday night letter without knowing of Scali; how did they interpret it? Who knew on Saturday that there had been a Friday night answer to Scali; in effect, an answer to the Friday night letter?

What were beliefs of Ex Comm, President, as to whether K had received reply to Scali before sending Turkey letter?

Were other channels being used simultaneously: Dobrynin-RK, Dobrynin--Thompson, Kohler-Gromyko? (Pachter). Were British in circuit? Friday night? Saturday?

S. believes: K got Scali reply Friday night, and this reassured him that US, interested in negotiating this deal, was unlikely to take violent action immediately; K had time to try Turkey deal.

((But how about Scali emphasis on "little time"?))

Question then becomes: What changed his mind 24 hours after Turkey letter?

S. answer: the "signal of utmost alarm." (See Pachter)

((Were there other channels as well?

Was threat specific? Did it unequivocally go beyond increasing the blockade? Was it regarded by JFK as absolute commitment? What did he foresee as possible, probable responses? When exactly was it sent? Relation to concern over retaliation against Turkey?

Is it possible there was direct answer Saturday night? Might retal. against Turkey ever have been specifically threatened?

(S. thinks not).

Why didn't K use more of period allowed? (Analogy: immediate turning back of snips after speech?)

((Why is signal held so tightly? Why are all private comms held quite so tightly? Has there been bad past experience on this?

S. had not considered possibility that U-2 shootdown, if accident, might have frightened K. (Note Pachter: according to RK, it did determine JFK to increase recon and blockade. And...?)

((How would "signal" of dismantling Turk missiles have appeared in combination with this? Would this be considered?

Who on ExComm, others, knew of Signal?

Southern started study with assumption that ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ the public record--and even the private record then available--did not support

((Certainly Sept 11 statements and Gropyko statements and in describing the role of the Sov "specialists"--and hence were extremely misleading.))

S. Study started with a directive from McC to analyse what it was ((not, whether?)) that we had done that had led ~~to~~ K to believe that he could get away with it.

Rostow points to his memo of Aug '62, pointing to pressures on K, and possibility that they might lead him to: 1) improve strategic balance; 2) put pressure on Berlin; or 3) increase Cuba as militant base. But 1 and 3 did not lead Rostow to predict missiles in Cuba; rather, his paper indicated building up Cuba as a base for subversion.

((It is a plausible hypothesis that int. comm. is inhibited from taking "reassuring signals" fully, explicitly, or realistically into account, either consciously or in published results.))

Thus; his "explanation" still leaves action unlikely; he is forced to regard it as "irrational": impulsive, erratic, wishful, reckless.

((S. tends to emphasize: K probably gave more weight, wishfully, to reassuring signals than he should. He doesn't consider as much that K may have given more weight to incentives--considered situation more urgent, alternatives worse--than he "should." How about "last change" aspect? How about effect of recent improvement in balance?))

Concept and execution clearly indicate that Sov authorities made no appreciable effort to prevent or delay US detection by aerial recon during the deployment phase. /of the offensive wear
It is believed that the most likely explanation is that they judged the risk of a US military reaction to be very slight.

((Mandelstam: they had camouflage nets with them--this degree of preparation--but didn't use them till late in October (date?); first camouflage in response to low-level flights on 23 Oct was natural cover (M. guessed a failure by local commander to carry out camouflage plan; or perhaps nets were not loaded correctly, etc. One analyst told him nets would have delayed recognition a couple of weeks. Infrared gear was not being used, though available (?).))

((Did Sovs believe it possible to prevent detection? Report says would have been difficult to conceal IRBM sites; though could have delayed starting these.))

Concurrency: Sov concept obviously did not envision the initial establishment of an island defense in order to test US reaction and screen the subsequent introduction of strat missile forces.

((So McC guess was wrong in reasoning, though right in conclusion. But does failure to use SA-2's against U-2's indicate indifference? Would Sovs have been willing to shoot down a U-2? Report doesn't comment. SA-2's could have been more deterrent if they had activated radars. Or would they? They were deterrent, weren't they; overflights did cease for over a month. (Were SA's a factor?) Might this have been hoped by Sovs? (presumably not, given failure to activate).))

Im (In concluding that Sovs regarded risk as low, failure to use SA-2's is one ground; another, no apparent effort to minimize time during which some MRBM units were detectable before all of the MRBM units were operational--but would this be critical to US reaction, once some units were operational?

Third: failure to camouflage.

The conclusion seems inescapable that the Sov authorities () chose to ignore the distinct possibility of US overflights in planning the Cuban operation. This choice seems inexplicable unless the Soviet leaders judged with considerable assurance that the US would acquiesce in the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba--or at least that the US would not attempt to force their removal by reacting militarily--and hence that the possibility of US detection was not critical to the success or failure of the venture.

((But: no mention of the fact that this was not a departure from familiar pattern, but a reproduction of standard procedure in SU: careful ground screening, deceptive public statements and private statements, covered movements, but open to air recon; it does not have to be explained on ad hoc basis (this is to ignore organizational/procedural inertia, compartmentalization, lack of adaptation). Also, little attention to measures that were taken to cover and deceive; SU grounds for pessimism as to success; and alerts (discounted).

(Myth of Mondith? Of choice, planning, attention, coordination, optimum adaptation?)

Failed hyp. that Opponent is a rational & impersonal decision-maker?

or, calculation (rationality unimpaired?)

(Landscape of "choice" - known uncertainties & risks or world unknown & decisions - as known in a known - T - as - T -

2.

Possibility considered that actual planners were unaware of or grossly underestimated US recon capabilities; seems unlikely. But reasons for dismissing are U-2 trial, and Sov recognition there of U. capabilities; and fact that Chief of Air Defense at that time became Chief of SRF. Can this be dismissed?

(Rules of the game): Having lived restively under the shadow of US strategic bases for more than a decade, the Sov leaders ~~may~~ probably have come to regard them, particularly in the age of the ICBM, as a disquieting but not major phenomenon of great power relations. Castro's Cuba provided K with ~~xxx~~ his first opportunity to establish an overseas military base. He may have felt confident that the US would understand the rules as he did--that military bases on the opponent's periphery are facts of great power life which fall far short of a provocation to war.

((If so, he failed to see asymmetry of power as a rule of the game; or was ready to change it, in which case he could have foreseen resistance, or possibility that US hadn't noticed it was time for a change.

Or: is it possible that bases really weren't as salient for SU, by now, as for US; i.e., that Turkey no longer "provokes" them to extent that Cuba does us? Is it possible he really underestimated: a) the degree to which this move would provoke us, or irritate us--aside from the likelihood of US response; b) the gains to him--or losses to us--which, in our judgment, he would have achieved if we had acquiesced? i.e., that one reason he judged likelihood of response as low is that he underestimated degree of motivation.))

Objectives:

Strategic change produced by Cuba would have been short-lived, given planned increases in US ICBM and Polaris deployment in 1963; reason for expecting success to be followed by attempt to achieve dramatic victory elsewhere, Berlin.

((Berlin 1962 was thus an Averted Crisis. Cuba 1962 is an example of a crisis in which Sov victory would have consisted precisely in establishing a base for a substantive victory in a subsequent crisis, or phase.

Les Crises en Chaine. (or: The Century of Crisis.)

Noise and Inference:

More than 200 reports refer to presence on Cuba of missiles before Jan 62. Numerous reports refer to construction activity and equipment observed during spring of 1962 in areas where SAM sites were located later; however, photography failed to reveal any such activity or equipment. But strong possibility that this reporting reflected influx into Cuba, beginning in early 1962, of Sov personnel (and vehicles?) somehow connected with the buildup beginning physically in late July.

((Hypothesis: A common pattern, like that in Cuba: Forerunners of later threat--perhaps personnel, rumors, phenomena not observable by air recon--give rise to exaggerated agent reports of observable activity; 2) photos disprove presence of such activity, and tend to discredit totally, or excessively (?) the agent reports; so that (3) later reports, based on firmer grounds, find preconceptions hardened against them, and reduced/delayed tendency even to accept risks and costs of checking them by further recon (note suspension of flights); especially if (4) photos do turn up phenomena that serves as alternative explanation for reports.

Hyp II: Negative results from photos have--unjustifiably--a strong effect on expectations comparable to that of positive results; and have excessive weight in undermining positive agent reports.

Effects of such "noise" on the "chain of command" (negative) tend to be "feedback" into the "chain of command" (positive) and "feedback" into the "chain of command" (negative).

3.

((Hyp II follows automatically if it is the case (Mandelstam) that top decision-makers (Ike?) really look seriously only at photos, SI, dismiss agent reports; then negative results from former are essentially the only evidence considered.

Task: analyze timing and content of data available only from agent reports.

In light of experience, evaluate relation of collateral sources and photos, SI; are they being best used to complement each other?))
Are collateral sources underused by top decision-makers? Should latter be wary of ~~examining~~ using other sources to invalidate totally the "smoke" shown by collateral sources?

Examine the total "noise" background of collateral sources.

Examine preconceptions which analysts, and decision-makers bring to evidence: not only gross ones (SU wouldn't do it)) but details of linkages (McC: If SA's come, can MRBM's be far behind?)

In Cuba, some Sov activities observed for first time ((likewise, US)): so: a) they couldn't be fully interpreted at the time; (b) in future, it will be possible to interpret them, thanks to Cuba.

((Same for US; question: impact of Cuba on ability to interpret each other's behavior, and to communicate if desired, in future crises. WHAT ALERTING/PREPARATORY PROCEDURES HAVE STILL NEVER BEEN OBSERVED, ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER? What surprises, confusions, might this create in future, intense crisis? Can these serve to define levels of intensity, as yet unobserved? What will serve to flag the unprecedented nature of a future crisis? Are top decision-makers aware of degrees of unprecedentedness of US actions they may contemplate? and of difficulties of interpretation, as well as of signal of intent?

Was US dispersal in Cuba the waste of a powerful signal (Bennington/Schelling); in what ways did use then condition impact of a similar act in future?

Sovs: tested possible Air Defense fight dispersal plan, beginning in May 62; crisis took place in fall, when Sov forces are at peak proficiency (for Berlin crisis?); may have restricted preparations to a minimum to ensure strategic surprise.

Sovs Sept 11 alert appeared to be a response to militant US announcements ((How was it interpreted by US decision-makers? As political ploy?))

In retrospect, appears to have been initiated as a response to the 7 Sept request by JFK for authority to fall up reserves because, unknown to US, this call-up coincided with the initial introduction of missiles into Cuba. In all probability, the call-up caused grave concern in the USSR about possible US knowledge of their 'missile venture'. This alert was reduced in late Sept or early Oct after the Sovs realized that their missile venture was continuing undetected by the US.

((But 5 Sept recon would not have disclosed missiles; they might have started arriving by 7 Sept (could they have by 2 Sept?), but Sovs knew no flights (might they have feared 5 Sept flight showed something? e.g., 29 Aug flight showed vehicles and construction material at IRBM sites))

15 Oct: standby alert, probably because of Sov realization that venture had been detected by 14 Oct flight

16 Oct: activation of Sov Far East weather reporting for North America for first time (?)

23 Oct Sat Forces placed on alert

What was purpose of Sov deception? Who were they trying to deceive? Note pattern of making tough, deceptive statement after having invalidating it, by action, private statement: ships would run blockade (to businessman, JFK on 24 Oct, after publicly known ships had turned away (though still question of remaining ships: only 2 dry cargo?); Tass-man statement on 23 Oct; 27 Oct letter;

Can they have hoped to deter recon? Or to convey message that they would not reveal missiles, if we didn't, before election?

What did members of ExComm make of Sov intent in statements? How did they react?

What is K theory of significance of US elections? Had he promised not to embarrass, on 23 Aug (to Sorenson?) Might he have thought we were hoping, above all, that he would not break news before election?

Dobrynin-Sorenson, Aug 23, Sept 6; ~~Dobrynin-Sorenson~~ Bol Oct 1 (Oct 23);
(Aug. 29?)

Dob-Bowles, Oct 13; Gromyko Oct 18.

Hils: S may have told F, 2 or 3 days.

Gore: 26 Oct: 2

V: if what you have right to do to Cuba, we have right to do to Turkey or Iran. (But Turkey and Iran are weak, no threat).

If balance is equal, equal rights.

We will not disturb balance; No, we will not commit ourselves not to expand, not to upset balance...

We had miscalculated, e.g. in Cuba. Interpretation: you made a mistake in Cuba.

Why secrecy of comm? Reluctant to make explicit ultimatum; embarrass K, make it hard to accept?

See Vienna,

McC's role fairly creditable. Honeymoon messages, late Aug --third week in Sept: took evidence of SAMs as confirming suspicions; as compared to analysts, gave more weight to possibility of irrational, radical, out-of-pattern move by K; and gave more weight to actual advantages of move to K. Criticized est. of Sept 19 ((often may give verbal dissent from est--verbal footnote--in giving it to Pres))

((Did analysts give too much weight to the "obvious" risks of move: not only judging perception of these risks by Sovs, without direct evidence, but judging "actual" risks--in effect, predicting decisions of US Pres. How well qualified is anybody now--and in particular, Sov experts or intelligence analysts in general--to make this prediction? How much was it based on general considerations, generalized circumstances, rather than on a variety of specific circumstances, or a predicted range of circumstances?))

((McC tendency to have great confidence in his intuitions; reluctant to change in face of analysts evidence or argument. Is Was he then also unfettered by knowledge or experience of weight of past evidence on K behavior?

Yet, how much evidence was there for analysts--Kent--implicit assumption that K's behavior was stable, rational, informed, predictable, prudent? Let alone, that this is fair assumption for most political leaders.))

stions for S and H:

1. How did the authors' own guesses or preconceptions change in the course of their study? What new patterns emerged in the course of it? What hypotheses were disconfirmed?
2. What divergent, or invalid, beliefs were found to be held by other students, and by participants? What "wrong lessons" may have been learned?
3. What conclusions are sensitive to information not available then to participants, or to some important participants? To public?
4. What sorts of data did not authors not have adequate access to? What sorts couldn't they refer to?
5. What questions are left hanging? What major uncertainties remain?
6. What impressions were acquired as to patterns of dispute, inference or behavior that have also arisen in other crises?
7. What agency differences emerged in interpretation, prediction, policy, management: prior to and during crisis?
8. How well do staff and agency inputs to ExComm reflect the actual preoccupations, goals, predictions of members?
9. What did individual ExComm members fear, if they did nothing?

Source/evidence for:

- 1) ~~Jan-report~~ that K intended to ~~xxx~~ improve strategic balance.

Any chance that actual changes in balance of spring '62 seemed to make venture safer (than in fall '61, for example)?

4. How would missile deployment have "strengthened K's bargaining position" over Germany? What circumstances were critical to this; what would have affected result?

e.g., was it important to present US with surprise? How would disclosure have been made? Was it important to surprise U.S. Allies?

Would K have expected JFK to commit himself in Sept? ~~xxx~~ Might K have avoided this...by reducing secrecy, by private disclosure, public disclosure?

What alternative modes of ~~xxx~~ procedure were open to K, and why were they probably rejected (if considered)?

5. Given various advantages of successfully installing missiles in Cuba: were these given adequate weight in earlier estimates that they would not install? What do authors conclude about estimating process, preconceptions?

To what extent did it serve SU purposes to put missiles in Cuba, vs. other locations within MRBM range? Did they take into account the peculiar disadvantages, in terms of U.S. readiness to respond, sensitivity?

Did US commitments actually serve as incentive to install, to show up US bluff and demoralize Allies?

6. Given incentives to install, and given reasons for disbelieving JFK commitments: what could JFK have said, and what could US have done, to convince K that deployment was unprofitable? Prior to 1962; prior to Aug-9 1962; between July-Sept 1962?

Sunday questions:

20. Why wasn't recon done if: how is objection figure in Administration statement responses, recon, intelligence, ?
21. Why wasn't recon done if: from July in view of: a) S. build-up; peculiar features: size, race, etc.; b) channel (what is the channel?); c) location; d) commitment to serve; e) the weather; f) incident loss of overhead recon?
22. How could it have been done better?
23. Have procedures of SG changed since Cuba?
24. What thinking has been done by SG, Pres, on what we might do--and how effective it might be--prior to Sept 4, 13 statements, or between Sept 20--Oct 16?
25. What if K had not gotten out, or shot more planes, Sunday morning? Chances of initiative on trade? Arguments against trade, Saturday night?
26. Interpretation of F-S; (other? RFK-Dob, Thompson-Dob?) Friday night letter; Saturday morning letter.
27. Expectations of effect of ultimatum. Interpretation of shootdown. Attitude towards political track as of Saturday afternoon.
28. What surprised Khrushchev during crisis; why? What did he expect?
29. What surprised ExComm members during crisis; any of their own or each others' reactions? Allied reactions? Continued SU deception? SU backdown?
How well would our own moves have been foreseen earlier? e.g., Presidential choices.
30. Intelligence process in retrospect. Sensitivity over recon incidents; restrictions on dissemination (good?); skepticism toward McCone, agents, refugees; confidence in SI; assumptions on speed on Sovx movements;
31. Private channel in retrospect: before crisis.
32. Had we "overcommunicated" a concern for legality (were they too reassured by the legality of their actions and the illegality of ours?): i.e., had we failed to communicate conditions under which we would pursue "illegal" action to protect our power and security?

Questions for McGeorge Bundy

1. Fever chart of expectations, concerns.
2. Relative influence on expectations of: various Sov statements; Sept 28 letter; Sept 11 statement; McCone; estimates; "high-level Sovietologists; own appreciation of Sov goals, perceptions, tactics.
3. Most influential "deception". Private channel mentioned by JFK. Any little-known Sov statements on deception; on their expectation that we would discover by recon; on their estimates? Conscious estimate of their willingness to deceive?
4. Why not more specific queries on private channel, or to Dobrynin?
5. Motives, expectations leading to Sept 4 statement? Relation to NSAM 181? Sept 13 warning? (How much deterrent; how much reassurance, on Sept 4; how much answer to political opposition?)
What if expectation of MRBMs had been higher? e.g., if McCone had been around; if Sovs had introduced missiles elsewhere; if estimates had put higher?
6. Effect on later problems, responses, of these JFK warnings, commitments.
7. Personal response to news: surprise, emotion, interpretation, view of responses. Had suspicion been growing? Who did McG tell? What did he do, think about?
8. President's response; above. Where was he Sunday night? Why?
9. Reaction to deception; interpretation of Sov motives in deception?
10. What if: a) no deception; b) no Pres commitments (e.g., no Keating); c) Sovs had informed JFK: August; Pre-Sept statements; pre Oct 14; pre Oct 22? What if they told Allies;
11. What if Sovs had exploited SAMS or protest to stop U-2s? Role of incidents on Sept 10 meeting. What if missiles had been discovered earlier? Fear of incidents before election; effect of Debrynin Sept 6 reassurance?
12. What if missiles hadn't been found till they and SAMs were operational?
13. Distribution of Sept 28 letter. Interpretation; effect on later expectations (e.g., on Sov resistance to blockade; on Sov interference in Berlin.)
14. How close to immediate air strike? What would have triggered? How would it have come out?
15. Decision to focus on K/SU rather than Castro; who, when, why?
16. Decision to emphasize deception in private communications to K, then and later.
17. Sequence of attitudes on trades as means of getting missiles out; what was JOCK's desire on Saturday afternoon, evening. What arguments were decisive?
18. When would we have released word on Il-28s?
19. Why did K think he could get away with it? Why didn't he believe threats? Why didn't we pick up this possibility? What finally convinced him?

Questions for McInerney

1. Fever chart of expectations, early August on.
2. Attitude to Sept 4 statement; reserve authority; Sept 13 statements. Was crisis necessary?
3. Evaluation of political implications, motives.
4. What if expectations of missiles had been somewhat higher?
5. Attitude to McCone's predictions.
6. Relative influence of: estimates; McCone; Sov statements; own evaluations; other "experts".
- 6a: Influence of U-2 incidents on Sept 10 decisions.
7. On first learning (when?): a) surprise; b) reaction; c) view of alternatives, considerations, payoffs, expectations;
8. Attitude on: immediate strike; warning; political route/ trades; air strike after blockade; likelihood of K backdown. When did blockade--strike (threat) pattern emerge?
9. F-S, Friday night letter; interpretation. Saturday morning letter. Role in fashioning response. Interpretation of U-2 shootdown. Attitude on ~~xxxx~~ rendering Irbis non-operational, removing them: Saturday night; Sunday.
10. Importance of getting missiles out; importance of method; why? Military vs. political motives.
11. Who did early calculations on requirements for air strike, effects? How close was Irbis to that? What would have triggered it?
- 12.
12. What if K hadn't backed down, or shot more planes, Sunday morning?
13. Was blockade/preparation for strike seen as likely to get missiles out? What hopes for ultimatum?
14. Specific basis for fear of retaliation against Turkey; probability?

Questions for S and M:

1. How did the authors' own guesses or preconceptions change in the course of their study? What new patterns emerged in the course of it? What hypotheses were disconfirmed?
2. What, divergent, or invalid, beliefs were found to be held by other students, and by participants? What "wrong lessons" may have been learned?
3. What conclusions are sensitive to information not available then to participants, or to some important participants? To public?
4. What sorts of data did not authors not have adequate access to? What sorts couldn't they refer to?
5. What questions are left hanging? What major uncertainties remain?
6. What impressions were acquired as to patterns of dispute, inference or behavior that have also arisen in other crises?
7. What agency differences emerged in interpretation, prediction, policy, management: prior to and during crisis?
8. How well do staff and agency inputs to ExComm reflect the actual preoccupations, goals, predictions of members?
9. What did individual ExComm members fear, if they did nothing?

Source/evidence for:

- 1) ~~that K intended to~~ that K intended to ~~xxx~~ improve strategic balance.

Any chance that actual changes in balance of spring '62 seemed to make venture safer (than in fall '61, for example)?

4. How would missile deployment have "strengthened K's bargaining position" over Germany? What circumstances were critical to this; what would have affected result?

e.g., was it important to present US with surprise? How would disclosure have been made? Was it important to surprise U.S. Allies?

Would K have expected JFK to commit himself in Sept? ~~xxx~~ Might K have avoided this...by reducing secrecy, by private disclosure, public disclosure?

What alternative modes of ~~xxxxxx~~ procedure were open to K, and why were they probably rejected (if considered)?

2.

1. Blockade. Worst form. divisive, involves allies.

Action taken concurrently: call for summit. Expecting response against vulnerable..

Alternatives:

Ball: I. Limited immediate action. announced low level surveillance.

Guilty of action contrary to what have said.

Deflecting world by putting in political context.

If he accepts we move from strength.

Bilateral summit?

II. a. Start with political. This stops mil.

b. Start with blockade, and surveillance.

Say we not going to ~~Polyxultimatum~~

Poli ultimatum

Could K. maintain himself if he did not respond. Attacks Turkish weapons least he could do.

Martin: If in 5 days they don't remove we would invade. Faces K with no out.

Johnson: emissary to Castro. Get rid or we are going to attack. Treat as a Castro, not Soviet problem. Has to accept OAS team.

A.G.: Why is Castro going to accept.

Thomp: See whether he will break with Soviets.

Johnson: Limit it to offensive weapons.

Taylor: Why don't we relax about it. Accept it as another target.

McN: Political approach will stop mil. action.

Martin: If not backed up with mil. pol. ineffective.

McN: No mil threat justifying response. What is minimum response.

Blockade plus surveillance

Search and inspection of Soviet ships.

Removal.

McN. Variant. Surveillance. Will attack Soviet Union if preparation to launch against US.

Ball: Any further action to make operational we will act. How do we act.

Taylor: No intermediate position. Accept or don't accept these missile bases.

A.G. Give nucs to Germans. They wouldn't.